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‘‘‘Seven shillings is not exactly the millennium”; economic liberalism and 
the campaign for a miners’ minimum wage in the Durham coalfield’ 
 




The Durham Miners’ Association (DMA) was one of the best established, 
wealthiest and largest trade unions in Britain. Yet economic liberalism, 
specifically that miners’ wages had to be determined by coal prices, dominated 
the thinking of the DMA’s leaders as well as many ordinary Durham miners. 
The minimum wage was an indispensable way for radicals to attack these 
notions. As the Liberal-dominated Durham leadership remained hostile, the task 
of winning converts to the minimum wage fell to the union’s radical activists. 
This article explores the rank and file movements that coalesced around 
advocacy of the minimum wage from their re-emergence in summer 1911, and 
considers  the debates on the votes for national strike action on the issue in 
1912. It charts the campaigns’ changing aims, achievements and weaknesses 
after the minimum wage was formally won.  
 
***** 
In March 1912, over one million British coal miners, co-ordinated by the 
Miners’ Federation of Great Britain (MFGB), held their first truly national strike 
for a minimum wage.1 The MFGB had organized national strike action before, 
 
Acknowledgements; my thanks for material to Kevin Davies, Dave Douglass and James 
Thompson and for comments on earlier versions of this article to Keith Gildart, Peter Mates, 
Paul Smith and the anonymous referees. Email lewis.mates@yahoo.co.uk 
1 There are good general accounts of the miners’ minimum wage campaign in R. Page Arnot, 
The Miners: Years of Struggle, 1889–1910 (Allen and Unwin, 1949), pp. 80–1; H. A. Clegg, A 
History of British Trade Unions Since 1889: Vol.2, 1911–1933 (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1985), 
 
  
against a proposed 25% reduction of wages in 1893. On that occasion, it did not 
have the support of the Durham Miners’ Association (DMA), Britain’s best-
established and wealthiest miners’ union. The Durham miners’ non-involvement 
ensured an unsuccessful outcome and the union’s very short period of affiliation 
to the MFGB (only begun in 1892) abruptly ended. Indeed, the MFGB’s 
founding demands (1889) of a minimum wage (together with the eight-hour 
day) had kept the Durham miners out before 1892 and they were to remain 
serious obstacles to the DMA’s involvement thereafter. Neither was popular in 
Durham, a district that had developed its own peculiar working practices (shared 
only by the smaller Northumberland coalfield), which were determined in 
considerable part by Durham coal’s dependence on the highly fluctuating 
international market. Liberal economic notions were firmly embedded in the 
coalfield’s complex and well-developed machinery for pay determination. 
Economic liberalism also informed the outlooks of the main DMA leaders, most 
 
pp. 45–52. For detail of 1912 strike and solidarity see R. Church and Q. Outram, Strikes and 
Solidarity: Coalfield Conflict in Britain 1889–1966 (Cambridge University Press: 2002) ch. 7. 
Apart from these, George Askwith provided a first-hand account of the political context and 
high-level minimum wage negotiations; there is a short account of the minimum wage by Brian 
McCormick, and essential contextual material in Roy Church and Barry Supple’s volumes in the 
History of the British Coal Industry series. See also James Thompson’s recent discussion of the 
minimum wage. G. R. Askwith, Industrial problems and disputes (J. Murray: 1920); B. J. 
McCormick, Industrial Relations in the Coal Industry (Macmillan: 1979); R. A. Church, The 
History of the British Coal Industry Vol. 3, 1830–1913: Victorian Pre-Eminence (Oxford 
University Press: 1986); B. Supple, The History of the British Coal Industry Vol. 4: The Political 
Economy of Decline, 1913–46 (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1987); J. Thompson, ‘Political 
economy, the labour movement and the minimum wage, 1880–1914’ in E. H. H. Green and D. 
Tanner (eds), The Strange Survival of Liberal England: Political Leaders, Moral Values and the 
Reception of Economic Debate (Cambridge University Press: 2007), pp. 62-88. 
 
  
notably its general secretary, John Wilson, who consistently argued that 
coalowners and workers shared a common interest in maintaining mining’s 
profitability.2 The minimum wage had long been unpopular as it was expected to 
render Durham’s pits (and especially the older mines in the west of the county 
often with very narrow coal seams) unprofitable. 
 
The situation changed fundamentally with the 1906 Liberal government’s 
legislation on the eight-hour day. Durham miners’ MPs delayed its passage in 
Parliament, but the Coal Mines Act was finally enacted in 1908. The main 
reason for self-exclusion was now redundant, and Durham miners voted for the 
DMA to join the MFGB. Durham instantly became the federation’s second 
largest section, with commensurate influence. This had important ramifications 
for the MFGB’s other major policy, the miners’ minimum wage, which took on 
new impetus after the bitter ten-month Cambrian Combine dispute in the south 
Wales coalfield (from November 1910). In short, for any truly national 
concerted action on the issue, the MFGB needed the DMA’s support. It could 
not risk the kind of damaging split that had occurred in 1893. But, with 
economic liberalism apparently entrenched in the coalfield, it was by no means 
certain that the Durham miners would endorse MFGB action for a minimum 
 
2 Wilson’s (Primitive) Methodism informed all aspects of his liberalism. In September 1912, for 
example, he argued that Christianity helped the miners to view their employers ‘as men’. The 
single most important substantial critique of Wilson’s attitudes and leadership of the Durham 
miners in this period was ‘Does Dr. John Wilson MP, secretary of the Durham Miners’ 
Association, Serve the Working Class?’. Its publication in pamphlet form saw its author, 
revolutionary industrial unionist George Harvey, successfully sued for libel by Wilson. Durham 
Chronicle, 27 September 1912; Evening Chronicle, 7 November 1912; Times, 25 March 1915; J. 
Wilson, Memories of a labour leader (T. Fisher Unwin: 1910). 
 
  
wage. The DMA’s rules required a two-thirds majority vote for strike action. 
With its main leaders still steeped in economic liberalism, opposed to the 
minimum wage in principle, and keen to use the rulebook to prevent members’ 
action if they could, the responsibility to win a two-thirds majority vote for 
strike action in 1912 fell to the coalfield’s radical activists. Facing an entrenched 
leadership and operating in a highly stratified, hierarchically-organized 
workforce divided along numerous lines of demarcation, these activists faced an 
apparently Herculean task.    
 
None of the main histories of the Durham coalfield covering the early twentieth 
century have explicitly discussed the post-1910 minimum wage movements.3 
 
3 Of the published works specifically on Durham, Moore’s provides the best account of the early 
rank and file campaigns, including that for the minimum wage before 1910, although it draws 
heavily on Gregory’s (then contemporaneous) work, especially for the period after 1910. 
Beynon and Austrin provided a distillation of Lawson and Moore’s work. Dave Douglass’ 
brilliant studies of the Durham miners’ rank and file movements concentrated more on responses 
to the eight-hour day in the coalfield after 1910 (for which also see McCormick and Williams’ 
pioneering work). There is some useful material in Norman Emery’s books and in masters theses 
by Craig Marshall and Ray Physick. R. Moore, Pit-men, Preachers and Politics (Cambridge 
University Press: 1974); H. Beynon and T. Austrin, Masters and Servants: Class and Patronage 
in the Making of a Labour Organisation (Rivers Oram Press: 1994); D. Douglass, Pit Life in 
County Durham. Rank and file Movements and Workers’ Control (Ruskin College, Oxford: 
1972); D. Douglass, ‘The Durham Pitman’, in R. Samuel (ed.), Miners, Quarrymen and Salt 
Workers (Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1977), pp. 205–96; B. McCormick and J. E. Williams, 
‘The Miners and the Eight-Hour day, 1863–1910’, Economic History Review 12:2 (1959), pp. 
222–38; N. Emery, Banners of the Durham Coalfield (Sutton, Stroud, 1998) and N. Emery, The 
Coalminers of Durham (Sutton, Stroud: 1992); C. Marshall, ‘Levels of Industrial Militancy and 
the Political Radicalisation of the Durham Miners, 1885–1914’ (MA, Durham University: 
1976); R. Physick, ‘The Great Unrest, 1910–1914. An Analysis of the Strikes and the Role 
 
  
What is published presents a disjointed picture of the Durham movement. Thus 
Jack Lawson’s autobiography contains a brief account of the Durham minimum 
wage campaign to the point when the Liberal government legislated on the issue 
in April 1912, but nothing of the bitter struggles that came after.4 Conversely, 
Hugh Clegg et.al. provided the only (and necessarily very brief) published 
discussion of the movement after May 1912, when it began calling itself the 
‘Durham Forward Movement’ (DFM).5 The most significant treatments of the 
minimum wage issue in Durham are in works by Roy Gregory and – more 
recently – Duncan Tanner. Both pointed to the apparent reluctance of Durham 
miners to embrace the minimum wage, arguing that they were relatively well 
remunerated and contented materially, and that their grievances were usually 
smoothed over by Durham’s sophisticated conciliation machinery. In 
emphasizing the firm grasp that economic liberalism apparently had on the rank 
and file as much as their leaders, Gregory and Tanner argued that, on the 
economic plane as much as the more narrowly defined ‘political’ plane, by 1914 
Durham miners remained some considerable ideological distance from the 
Labour Party.6 
 
Puzzlingly, there remains no in-depth study of the ways in which campaigners 
for a minimum wage made their case in the district unions during these years, 
 
Played by the Rank and file Committees on Tyneside and Merseyside’ (MA, Newcastle 
University: 1998). 
4 J. Lawson, A Man’s Life (Hodder and Stoughton: 1944). Lawson’s biography of DMA activist 
Peter Lee (Epworth Press: 1949) is also unrevealing on this. 
5 Clegg, A History of British Trade Unions, p. 47.   
6 R. Gregory, The Miners and British Politics, 1906–1914 (Oxford University Press: 1968); D. 
Tanner, Political Change and the Labour Party 1900–1918 (Cambridge University Press: 1990).  
 
  
the movements they raised and maintained, the tactical dilemmas they faced, 
and their successes and failures. This is surprising as the implications of the 
minimum wage campaigns were wide: they were as much part of an internal 
labour movement debate over strategy and tactics as they were a means of 
persuading the Liberal government and coalowners that miners should be paid a 
guaranteed minimum wage. Durham is significant as one of the largest and most 
influential of the MFGB districts that was also apparently among the least 
susceptible to arguments for a minimum wage. That said, there are hints that 
similar forces were at work in many other British coalfields. Published accounts 
of the Yorkshire and Derbyshire coalfield districts, for example, certainly 
suggest significant tensions between district leaders and members over the 
minimum wage (among other issues) in these crucial years, though they are not 
explored in any depth.7 
 
This article analyses the minimum wage’s challenge to economic liberalism on 
both material and ideological planes, offering a case study in the genesis and 
development of a significant and hitherto under-appreciated Edwardian miners’ 
rank and file movement. It charts the complex power struggle on the issue of the 
minimum wage between the union’s Liberal-dominated leadership, its 
Independent Labour Party (ILP) inspired rank and file movements, the MFGB, 
the Minimum Wage Boards, the Durham coalowners and the Liberal 
government. It argues that, while the context was certainly very challenging for 
campaigners for a minimum wage in Durham, conditions became far more 
favourable after 1910. Indeed, the minimum wage became a potentially potent 
 
7 C. L. Baylies, The History of the Yorkshire Miners, 1881–1918 (Routledge: 1993), pp. 367–97; 
J. E. Williams, The Derbyshire Miners: A Study in Industrial and Social History (Allen and 
Unwin: 1962), pp. 393–441.  
 
  
weapon for ILP activists to galvanize a growing and increasingly militant 
section of the DMA’s rank and file members and to undermine, on an 
ideological level, the central tenet of economic liberalism, that wages should be 
dictated by coal prices.8 As well as doing this, DMA general secretary Wilson’s 
opposition to the minimum wage allowed its advocates to draw a clearer 
distinction between themselves and him, at the same time undermining his 
position (and allowing him to discredit himself) as his oppositional stance 
alienated more miners. For their part, Durham coalowners demonstrated 
increasingly clearly that they certainly did not, contrary to Wilson’s 
protestations, regard theirs and their workforces’ interests as mutually 
constitutive. The minimum wage, before 1908 apparently a reason for the DMA 
to stay out of the MFGB, became after 1912 an issue on which the MFGB could 
intervene in support of Durham miners, thereby demonstrating the benefits of 
affiliation.  
 
Existing accounts tend to regard the 1912 votes to strike for the national 
minimum wage as the miners’ final pre-war verdict on the issue. In fact, the 
campaign to win a majority vote in favour of national strike action was merely 
one stage of development. The efforts of activists to make the minimum wage 
one worth having and to extend it to all workers in and around the mines 
allowed for more effective propaganda, and further weakened the Wilson–
liberal economic hegemony in Durham. This was in spite of the problems faced 
by the minimum wage movement in terms of articulating its appeal, making its 
demands felt and its ultimately poor record at securing actual material gains. In 
 
8 The best account of the ILP in the Durham coalfield to 1906 is D. Howell, British Workers and 
the Independent Labour Party 1888–1906 (Manchester University Press: 1983). 
 
  
sum, the story of the battle for the minimum wage in the Durham coalfield is far 
more complex (as well as chronologically longer), and, for opponents of 
economic liberalism, more positive than has been recognized.  
 
I   
 
Economic liberalism had a firm grasp on the DMA from the time of its 
foundation in 1869. In its infancy, DMA leaders promoted sliding scale 
agreements linking wages directly to Durham coal prices, notoriously 
unpredictable as they were determined by fluctuating international rather than 
more stable domestic markets. A Conciliation Board replaced the ‘sliding scale’ 
after the economic depression of the late 1880s had made it highly unpopular 
among miners, though the successor institution operated in essentially the same 
way, making wage awards only in relation to coal prices.9 From 1879, wage 
awards were calculated in terms of percentages on the basis rate, fixed at the 
lowest point in the cycle of coal prices. This mechanism also instituted a 3% 
differential in wages between underground and surfaceworkers. The latter lay at 
the bottom of the job hierarchy in Durham, which was integral to how the 
industry (and the union) worked, and the DMA was one of only two of the 
district miners’ unions to organize them. At the top of the hierarchy were the 
 
9 J. W. F. Rowe, Wages in the Coal Industry (P. S. King: 1923), pp. 40, 42; H. S. Jevons, The 
British Coal Trade (Redwood Press, Trowbridge: 1969), pp. 354–64; E. Welbourne, The Miners' 
unions of Northumberland and Durham (University Press, 1923), pp. 165–6, 170–6, 190–1; J. 
Wilson, A History of the Durham Miners’ Association, 1870–1904 (J. H. Veitch and Sons, 
Durham: 1907), pp. 132–59, 178, 202–3, 297–316; H. A. Clegg, A. Fox, A. F. Thompson, A 
History of British  Trade Unions Since 1889: Vol.1 1889–1910 (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1964), 
pp. 19–20, 23, 103–104. 
 
  
hewers, the coalface workers, who usually earned piecework rates. Immediately 
below them were the ‘putters’, who filled and transported the coal tubs 
underground. That the interests of hewers dominated negotiations around wages 
and conditions is in part explicable because of the career structure in Durham 
mines, whereby most younger underground miners could anticipate becoming 
hewers in their working lives. This was in marked contrast to coalfields such as 
south Wales where there was no such clear career progression to the best jobs 
for younger miners, and has been offered as one reason for the greater industrial 
unrest in south Wales.10 Nevertheless, the onus was on campaigners for a 
minimum wage to deal adequately with surfaceworkers’ grievances, as well as 
those of higher-placed grades of underground mineworker, as the potential 
consequences of sidelining or overlooking any group were serious. Given this 
hierarchy and the differing needs and demands of the various grades of 
mineworker, formulating policy that would galvanize and maintain their support 
was a major challenge to the minimum wage movement. These divisions later 
allowed the statutory Minimum Wage Board to operate a divide-and-rule policy, 
making awards that represented advances for some select grades of miner but 
left the wages of many other grades as they were.  
 
The Durham coalfield had briefly experienced an individual minimum wage 
between 1876 and October 1879. It ended when the owners demanded (further) 
wage reductions that the miners unsuccessfully resisted with a six-week strike. 
The new sliding scale dispensed with the minimum wage. Subsequently, 
Durham leaders, and especially Wilson, began arguing that the minimum wage 
 
10 See M. J. Daunton, ‘Down the Pit: Work in the Great Northern and South Wales Coalfields, 
1870–1914’, Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 34 (1981), pp. 578–97. 
 
  
was an ‘evil’ that provoked many local disputes and should therefore be avoided 
in future. They consistently and successfully resisted subsequent demands for a 
new minimum.11 Even after Durham joined  the MFGB, Wilson sustained his 
implacable hostility. In January 1912, he denounced the minimum wage as 
‘economically unpredictable’, just as the MFGB was engaged in a strike ballot 
on the issue.12  
 
Another problem for campaigners for a minimum wage was that, as Durham’s 
coal seams varied widely in size and ease of working, so did miners’ piecework 
earnings. Consequently, two institutions developed early in the Durham 
coalfield to obviate a good deal of the potential for industrial strife. The first was 
the ‘County Average System’. Established in 1872, it was implemented by a 
joint committee comprised of representatives of the coalowners and unions 
empowered to adjust price lists in any coal seam where average piecework 
earnings were higher or lower than the County Average by more than 5%.13 It 
thus acted, theoretically at least, as a minimum wage for every class of worker 
in Durham’s mines. This was not, however, an individual minimum as the 
County Average was ‘intended to equalize earnings across seams, not across 
individual workers.’14 In dealing with the long-term (predictable) characteristics 
 
11 Welbourne, Miners' Unions, pp. 185–6, 191, 193, 206–207, 213, 223; Wilson, Durham 
Miners, pp. 132–59, 164.  
12 The Times, 11 January 1912. 
13 Rowe, Wages, pp. 72–3. See also J. G. Treble and S. Vicary, ‘Equity, Efficiency and 
Insurance: Explaining the Structure of Miners’ Wage Payments in Victorian County Durham’, 
Economic Journal [EJ] 103:417 (1993), pp. 481–93. 
14 J. G. Treble, ‘Productivity and Effort: The Labor-Supply Decisions of Late Victorian 
Coalminers’, The Journal of Economic History 61:2 (2001), p. 427. 
 
  
of changing coal seams, the County Average was relatively successful in 
avoiding numerous local difficulties (often stoppages) resulting from fixing or 
altering price lists in coalfields, such as occurred in south Wales.15 
The Durham coalfield was almost unique in that, with ‘cavilling’ (an old 
practice the origins of which remain obscure), it had a second mechanism to 
overcome problems arising from the short-term and unpredictable variations in 
coal seams that the County Average could not address.16 Cavilling was a 
quarterly ballot whereby work places were alloted to hewers in order to 
distribute fairly the better and worse coal seams. It helped to maintain miners’ 
loyalty to the union, as well as being the main mechanism for workers to 
exercise considerable job control. It has been regarded as part explanation for 
the relative lack of industrial militancy in the Durham coalfield.17 These 
mechanisms certainly suggest that that campaigners for a minimum wage in 
Durham worked in testing conditions. As argued below, however, both the 
County Average and cavilling were open to intelligent and biting critique by 
advocates of the minimum wage.   
 
Finally, the complex effects of the passage of the Coal Mines Act had 
considerable significance for the subsequent minimum wage campaign. In 
response to the Act, the DMA leadership negotiated, without recourse to the 
lodges, the introduction of a three-shift system in order to allow the hewers to 
continue to work their shorter (seven-hour) day. Its introduction in January 1910 
 
15 Ibid., p. 417. 
16 Ibid., Treble and Vicary, ‘Equity’, EJ, p. 492; Rowe for example, was unclear about when 
caviling came about, though he suggested it was a ‘rough-and-ready but broadly effective 
method of doing justice’ that had a long history: Rowe, Wages, p. 147. 
17 Rowe, Wages, p. 58; Clegg, A History of British Trade Unions, p. 448.  
 
  
was met by mass unofficial (that is without the DMA executive’s approval) 
industrial action, demonstrating the militant mood and the anger of the rank and 
file. Although DMA officials narrowly survived a lodge vote of confidence, 
their reputations were severely tarnished. But the outcome had not helped the 
ILP either. While it had not extended hewers’ working hours, the ILP’s long-
held and, in Durham, controversial eight-hour day policy had still proved itself 
unpalatable in practical application. Many regarded the three-shift system’s 
application across the entire coalfield as a very high price to pay for an eight-




By summer 1911, a demoralized Durham ILP needed a new campaign to 
galvanize the coalfield.19 Paradoxically, the Eight Hours Act 1908 (EHA) had a 
positive impact on the origins of what was soon to become the Minimum Wage 
 
18 DMA council, 22 January 1910, D/DMA 30, Durham Record Office (DRO); W. R. Garside, 
The Durham Miners, 1919–1960 (Allen and Unwin: 1971), pp. 19–26. 
19 There are no reliable figures available for ILP membership in the Durham coalfield (the 
coalfield was but part of a larger ILP organizational region). The closest approximation is the 
number of Durham coalfield branches, which reached around 100 by 1914. These were different 
in size, and varied considerably from the highly active to moribund. The status of individual 
branches could also change quickly dramatically, so reliant were some on the activities of a 
handful of energetic individuals. Equally, the numbers ILP members active in the rank and file 
movement is difficult to determine, though it is clear that all its main leaders were in the ILP.  
More importantly, there were very many members of specific lodges affiliated to the movement 
who were not likely to have been ILP members; the rank and file movements were far more 
larger than the ILP in the Durham coalfield. 
 
  
Movement (MWM).20 The rank and file dissatisfaction the EHA engendered 
became a resource to be tapped by campaigners for a minimum wage.21 There 
was also a more widespread growing consternation in the Durham coalfield (as 
elsewhere) over rising prices that were squeezing miners’ incomes and building 
pressure for large wage increases. Then, in July 1911, the national ILP co-
ordinated a nationwide campaign to agitate for its ‘living wage for all’ national 
minimum wage of 30s.22 Durham ILP branches began holding well-attended 
propaganda meetings; Chopwell’s, for example, ‘was one of the best meetings 
held for some time.’23 
 
By the third week of July 1911 another external intervention steered the issue 
more firmly towards an organized campaign inside the DMA. This was the 
appearance in the Durham coalfield of miner ‘missionaries’ from south Wales 
propagandizing for national strike action in support of the miners’ individual 
minimum wage. The missionaries spoke at such key coalfield centres as Stanley 
and Chester-le-Street and then appeared at the annual Durham miners’ gala on 
22 July. Denied an official DMA platform, the south Wales miners’ message 
nevertheless had an impact.24 At the gala, Wilson was persistently heckled when 
 
20 The term ‘minimum wage campaigns’ is used to cover the whole period to August 1914; 
minimum wage movement (MWM) denotes the campaigns in the period between summer 1911 
and the end of the 1912 strike only while ‘Durham Forward Movement’ (DFM) is the 
movement’s formally adopted name from May 1912.  
21 The Times, 27 September 1911.  
22 ILP Annual Conference Report, May 1912, ILP_12/1/2, British Library of Political and 
Economic Science (BLPES); Some ILP branches had held meetings on this theme in June. See 
Labour Leader, 9, 30 June 1911. 
23 Labour Leader, 14 July 1911. See also reports in Labour Leader, 21 and 28 July 1911. 
24 Ibid., 21 July 1911; Durham Chronicle, 21 July 1911; The Socialist, September 1911. 
 
  
speaking against south Wales’ proposed strike, whereas other speakers’ calls for 
support to the Welsh miners drew approving gala cheers.25 Wilson was left in no 
doubt of the south Wales missionaries’ pernicious effect.26 By the last week of 
July the ILP’s minimum wage campaign was now firmly attached to the miners’ 
demands; for example, at Beamish a large audience heard speeches on the 
minimum wage ‘from a miners’ point of view.’27  
 
The speaker that day at Beamish was Jack Lawson. He had been an ILP member 
since 1904 and had been sponsored to attend Ruskin College, Oxford, in 1908. 
Lawson spent a year and a half at Ruskin, using his contacts there as referees for 
positions on his return to the coalfield. Lawson’s ‘good ability, industry and 
perseverance’ made him an ideal candidate for a checkweighman’s post,28 which 
provided ‘a position from which you can do effective work for the elevation of 
the miners.’29 He was elected a checkweighman at Alma pit, near Chester-le-
Street in 1910. A second key activist, Andrew Temple, presided over the same 
Beamish meeting. Like Lawson, Temple was a checkweighman and was to 
become a MWM leader (he was also a Ruskin student, in 1913).30  
 
 
25 Durham Chronicle, 28 July 1911.  
26 Wilson’s Monthly circular No. 187, July 1911, D/DMA (Acc: 2157(D)) 202(box), DRO.  
27 Labour Leader, 28 July 1911. 
28 The miners of individual pits voted for checkweighmen to ensure that the owners were not 
underpaying for the weight of coal sent up, and it was thus a position that commanded 
considerable respect. Lawson reference from Dennis Hird, 26 August 1908, LAW 2/1/5, Palace 
Green Archive, Durham (PGAD). 
29 William Moore Ede letter (and reference) to Jack Lawson, 13 January 1909, LAW 2/1/6.  
30 Lawson, Man’s Life, pp. 74, 95–111, 116–120. 
 
  
Lawson was quick to admit the south Wales missionaries’ had done ‘more than 
anyone’ to sponsor a rebellious feeling among the Durham rank and file, ‘for 
there is great indignation in the county as to the way in which these men have 
been treated by the leaders’ (the MFGB stopped supporting the Cambrian 
Combine strikers in July 1911 and they were defeated soon after).31 August 
1911 saw the first rank and file demonstrations for the minimum wage, albeit at 
fairly localized meetings attended by only a handful of lodges. By this time the 
miners’ economic position had worsened: Durham Conciliation Board cut wages 
by 2½% with immediate effect in early August.32 Campaigners for a minimum 
wage noted that this coincided with reports of ‘coalowners who had declared 
dividends of 20 to 30%.’33 Durham miners’ wages then stagnated and the 
increase in the cost of living made for good propaganda on MWM platforms. 
Strikes, like that of the railway workers in August 1911, meant an MWM 
activist could comment credibly that ‘strike mania was in the air.’34 For his part, 
Lawson was clear that ‘the men of Durham have made up their minds to March. 
They are asking their leaders to lead. They will mark time no longer.’35 The rank 
and file movement took on more coherence at a mass conference, convened by 
three ILP-dominated lodges, on 2 September 1911 in Pelton near Chester-le-
Street, and chaired by W. P. Richardson (from 1898 secretary of Usworth lodge, 
 
31 Labour Leader, 11 August 1911; MFGB Annual Volume of Proceedings, 1911, MFGB 
special conference, 13–15 June 1911, Durham Miners’ Association Offices, Redhills, Durham. 
32 Durham Chronicle, 8 August 1911.  
33 Ibid., 8 September 1911. 
34 Ibid., 1 September 1911. See ‘Great Unrest’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations 33 
(2012).  
35 Labour Leader, 11 August 1911. 
 
  
Washington, and chair of Gateshead ILP district by 1910).36 The conference 
circularized all Durham lodges to maintain and extend the minimum wage 
agitation and there were at least sixteen (and probably more) mass MWM 
meetings throughout most of the coalfield before the 1912 national minimum 
wage strike.  
 
The Durham movement’s main aim was a hewer’s individual minimum wage of 
7s. (35p) per day (excluding accommodation allowance and free domestic coal), 
with other classes of mineworkers to receive a minimum commensurate with 
existing pay grades.37 They initially envisaged calling on MFGB support if their 
coalfield campaign failed, but events overtook them when the MFGB annual 
conference voted unanimously on 6 October 1911 in support of a minimum 
wage for all men and juveniles working in British mines. Faced with the 
coalowners’ continued opposition, the MFGB balloted members on strike action 
in January 1912.38 Durham MWM activists endorsed national action, though 
they framed any potential stoppage in apocalyptic terms: Lawson warned that a 
national strike ‘would lay the country to waste’, but insisted it was the only way 
to bring the owners to a ‘reasonable’ frame of mind.39 
 
36 Durham Chronicle, 8 September 1911; 12 April 1912; Marshall, ‘Industrial Militancy’, F4. 
37 John Lawson, ‘A Minimum wage for miners. Answer to critics in the Durham coal fields’ 
(ILP Publication Department, National Labour Press: 1912),  p. 3, ILP/5/1912/20. Durham 
coalowners provided an unusually high degree of accommodation or a rental allowance for most 
of their key married workers, though Daunton claimed that they did not try to use this as a 
means of social control. See M. Daunton, ‘Miners’ Houses: south Wales and the Great Northern 
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The Durham movement paid attention to the needs of other grades of 
mineworker. Elderly and infirm miners were particularly important as their 
wage levels had been factored in when the County Average was fixed, ensuring 
that younger, more energetic workers would always earn more than the County 
Average. A minimum wage excluding the elderly and infirm left the remaining 
workers in danger of suffering an effective wage reduction. Surfaceworkers’ 
grievances were also considerable; they worked up to 10¼ hours per day with 
wages (including the lodging allowance) amounting to around only 4s. 4d. 
(22p). By late December 1911, the Durham movement was calling for the 
inclusion of all surfaceworkers’ wages in the minimum. It expressed regret at 
surfaceworkers’ (arguably very damaging) omission from the MFGB’s 
demands.40 At this stage, while the MFGB was applauded by Durham militants 
for taking a national stand on the minimum wage, it could still disappoint.   
What was the MWM’s impact on DMA leaders before the 1912 strike? 
Certainly, the movement made serious and sustained criticisms, denouncing 
them for living on past reputations, condemning their apathy and 
unconstitutionality and calling for modernization.41 By March 1912, the MWM 
was claiming that DMA leaders were actually helping ‘the coal kings.’42 The 
leaders were understandably antagonized. DMA treasurer T. H. Cann launched a 
personal attack on MWM leader W. P. Richardson, and Wilson himself also 
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condemned the movement’s ‘slanders’, refusing to answer its charges.43 But 
DMA leaders did not comply with many of the movement’s demands. In 
December the executive began negotiating the exclusion of aged and infirm 
workers from the minimum, the very opposite of the MWM’s explicit request. 
Movement leaders could only criticize this action, made worse as the executive 
had no lodge mandate on the issue.44  
 
For over six weeks the Durham leaders ignored the MWM’s demands for a 
special meeting of DMA council (the union’s major decision-making body 
comprised of mandated lodge delegates) to consider its 7s. minimum demand. 
MWM claims that a special council meeting might pass a no-confidence vote in 
the leadership’s neglect of elderly and surfaceworkers was hardly an incentive. 
When a special council meeting was finally called, it simply involved Wilson 
giving a lengthy address before answering questions from delegates. 
Surfaceworkers were overlooked again. Further, the meeting’s decision that 
Durham delegates would vote against the exemption of the aged and infirm from 
any MFGB minimum wage demand was a short-lived victory for the MWM. In 
the event, the Durham contingent failed to push the inclusion of the elderly and 
infirm in minimum wage negotiations, because, Wilson claimed, the majority of 
miners’ district unions were opposed and Durham wanted to remain loyal.45 
Again, the MFGB, as well as Durham leaders, had disappointed the militants. 
The MWM’s 7s. minimum demand also received no support from the Durham 
leadership, which agreed with MFGB policy that minima in each coalfield 
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should be commensurate with current average wages. Thus it demanded, in 
January 1912, a minimum rate of 6s. 1¼d. (36p) per shift for Durham hewers, 
the then County Average.46 The MWM expressed regret that the DMA 
executive had not adopted its 7s. demand and that, as a consequence, the claim 
was not discussed at MFGB conference. Yet this probably would have made no 
difference. The MFGB agreed that affiliated districts could not secure a wage 
increase through minimum wage claims after hearing arguments that this would 
break existing Conciliation Board agreements in some districts. The MFGB did, 
however, stipulate that no district minimum should be under 5s. (and 2s. for 
juveniles) per day (except in the very smallest districts where such rates might 
mean job losses).47 The MWM ‘reluctantly’ accepted this, remarking that 
nothing lower than the ‘5 and 2’ claim ‘shall be entertained’ and pledging in 
February 1912 to continue pressing for 7s. and the inclusion of surfaceworkers 
in the minimum.48  
 
There were further failures for the MWM. Its demand that no-one opposed to 
the minimum wage should represent the DMA in negotiations was ignored; this 
was particularly directed at Wilson, who led the Durham deputation. Could the 
DMA leaders ignore the MWM as it was too small?  Fifty-three lodges (of sixty-
four invited) attended the 2 September 1911 Pelton conference, with several 
uninvited delegates from eastern districts also present (totalling 156 delegates in 
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attendance).49 This was out of a total of over 200 lodges with some 110,000 
members. Furthermore, this was by far the highest turnout at a single minimum 
wage-meeting before the 1912 strike.50 Nevertheless, the movement certainly 
enjoyed the overwhelming support of Durham’s largest lodges: at least fourteen 
of the twenty largest DMA lodges with over 26,600 members between them 
definitely supported the MWM.51 By March 1912, the MWM itself was 
claiming majority lodge support; the two 1912 national strike votes were soon to 




How effective was the MWM in convincing rank and file miners? Naturally, 
activists called for a vote in favour of national strike action on the minimum 
wage . In the January 1912 vote, 66.8% of Durham miners duly obliged. This 
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just exceeded the DMA’s rule requirement of a two-thirds majority in favour of 
striking. Indeed, Wilson had succeeded in getting the MFGB to adopt Durham’s 
two-thirds majority rule in voting on this strike issue.52 The vote was 
undoubtedly a blow to Wilson. It is certain that, given his continued opposition 
to the minimum wage, antipathy to the MFGB, and propensity to use the 
rulebook to his advantage, Wilson would have ensured that Durham miners did 
not join the minimum wage strike in 1912 had the two-thirds majority not been 
reached. Then, as in 1893, the MFGB’s planned national strike action would 
have lacked Durham’s considerable numbers and influence. It would not have 
been ‘national’ at all. Still, the Durham vote was the lowest margin in favour of 
all the major coalfields, belying some neutrals’ predictions.53 Duncan Tanner 
claimed the result showed that the DMA approached the strike ‘without 
enthusiasm’; that Durham miners remained wedded to their economic 
liberalism.54  
 
Yet the immediate context casts the result in rather a different light. The 
minimum wage on offer was regarded as lacking by minimum wage 
campaigners in several different ways. First, it was widely (and correctly) 
understood that the minimum being voted on excluded elderly, infirm and 
surfaceworkers, a considerable proportion of any colliery’s workforce. Indeed, 
there were around 200-odd surfaceworkers per colliery in some of the larger east 
Durham concerns (between 10% and 15% of the workforce). In openly opposing 
the minimum wage and the strike, Wilson exploited these omissions to breed 
inertia. A Durham executive circular urged all miners, ‘not merely the moderate 
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men but also the most ardent promoters of the minimum wage’, to consider the 
full implications for those excluded from any minimum.55 Thus a significant 
proportion of Durham miners were either hostile or indifferent to a minimum 
wage that excluded them. This partly explained the particular ambivalence to the 
minimum from lodges in the Spennymoor area in the south of the coalfield. At a 
MWM meeting there soon after the first vote was announced, John Bell 
(checkweighman of Dean and Chapter lodge), speaking from the audience, 
claimed that his lodge (one of the largest in the county) returned a majority of 
only three for striking because the minimum only applied to a small proportion 
of miners. Bell suggested that increasing the basis wage would be a greater gain 
than the minimum, as this would include surfaceworkers, though his other 
comments suggested that he was ideologically opposed to a minimum. While 
they received strike pay, surfaceworkers complained during the strike that they 
were still being ignored.56  
 
Second, some who stood to receive the minimum were unhappy with the 
demand for the County Average, suggesting instead a minimum that would 
represent a wage advance. Third, that the minimum would vary considerably 
between grades of miners, reflecting existing pay structures, was a source of 
consternation. In November 1911, John Storey, a prominent coalfield ILP 
leader, asked how campaigners for a minimum wage expected to ‘be seen as 
consistent when they did not demand a minimum wage of 7s. for all workers in 
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mines. He thought the owners might easily concede a minimum wage of 7s. or 
8s. a day and make larger profits than they do now.’57  
 
Fourth, campaigners for a minimum wage also had to deal with the issue of 
‘shirkers’, who apparently would take advantage of the minimum wage to work 
as little as possible and take the minimum. ‘Cavilling’ made this particularly 
acute as it meant that Durham miners worked with very little direct supervision. 
Consequently, the Durham coalowners expressed the strongest concerns of all 
owners over this issue, claiming that the impossibility of close supervision 
meant they could not ensure that hewers not reaching the minimum on 
piecework rates were working their hardest. Movement activists repeatedly 
assured audiences that there would be no ‘malingerers’ with the minimum wage. 
At one meeting, W. P. Richardson’s remark that working-class ‘shirkers’ were 
as big a parasite as shirking owners received generous applause.58 Lawson took 
a different tack, admitting that ‘in every mine some will skulk and not work; 
probably they have some aristocratic blood in them and live up to the reputation 
of the idle class.’59 
 
 In addition to union leaders’ opposition, the Durham Chronicle, the self-
proclaimed “miners’ friend”, indulged in more general scaremongering, 
claiming that the DMA’s funds could only last three or four weeks of a strike 
and, by then, money would be worthless anyway as there would be nothing to 
buy with it. It also quoted a ‘northern mine owner’ calling the strike a disaster 
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for an industry that would not regain some of the foreign markets any strike 
would lose them.60 Indeed, this consideration had prompted the Durham 
coalowners to accept, albeit grudgingly and belatedly, the minimum wage in 
principle before the strike began, presumably in an attempt to avoid it. This last 
minute concession was also very likely to have worked against those wanting a 
big majority in favour of striking.61  
 
Consequently, interpreting the Durham minimum wage vote is complicated. 
Strong MWM-supporting lodges generally returned heavy votes in favour of a 
strike (several MWM lodges made public their large majorities for a strike and 
were reprimanded for this by the executive). But some lodges, such as 
Redheugh (which certainly supported the movement after the strike), returned 
their ballot papers without voting, demonstrating that the issues had been 
confused to some extent. The generally weaker support for the minimum wage 
in southern and western parts of the coalfield was also related to fears for the 
economic future of local pits, especially the smaller ones, working thinner seams 
sometimes of only two feet or less depth. Yet, in spite of all these 
considerations, a requisite two-thirds majority of Durham miners still voted 
against Wilson’s wishes (and this was a ballot of all members, rather than a 
lodge one) and in favour of striking for a minimum wage.  
 
The minimum wage strike began on 26 February and was to last for thirty-seven 
days.62  Detailed local press reports on miners’ attitudes to going on strike in 
1912 suggested no lack of enthusiasm. The local press tended to stress the 
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holiday aspect of the strike, with miners organizing leisure activities (marbles, 
gardening, football) and enjoying the time off. Pit ponies brought up from 
below, entertained many. Attitudes differed as to how long the strike was 
anticipated to last; some, thinking it would be over in a matter of days, left their 
gear down the pit, while others were more pessimistic. Many lodges emphasized 
they would not cause trouble while on strike (as the MWM had itself), but there 
was no sign of consternation or apathy in any of the press reports. Many had 
taken precautions in stocking up on house coal and food stuffs (such as the 
woman who had bought in 50 stones of flour), though an early and orderly raid 
on coal wagons at Ryhope showed that miners could readily get hold of coal by 
other means if necessary.63 It is highly likely that had the minimum wage on 
offer been closer to its most ardent advocates’ demands in Durham, more would 
have voted to strike to secure it in the first ballot. 
 
On 29 March 1912 the Minimum Wage Act became law. The MFGB was 
dissatisfied as the legislation had no wages figures in it at all (the MFGB had 
demanded that it should have the ‘5 and 2’ and also rates for hewers in all 
districts). Instead, all minimum wage rates were to be agreed at district level in 
new joint district boards. In fact, the MFGB had asked Labour MPs to oppose 
the bill on its third reading, and decided to hold a second ballot of all miners 
over whether to accept the new law and end the strike, or to stay out for the ‘5 
and 2’ claim.64 In Durham, the same anti-strike forces went into action before 
the second ballot. The local press increased the tension; the Durham Chronicle 
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stoked up fears of revolutionary syndicalists, warning that if continued, the 
strike could destroy civilization ‘in one devastating maelstrom of disaster.’65 
More importantly, Wilson argued that the choice was ‘to accept the law of the 
land or strike against it’; naturally, he endorsed the former.66 He also highlighted 
the plight of workers in dependent trades who were laid off when the miners 
struck and claimed, rather disingenuously, that the Act was what the miners had 
asked for. In advising miners against continuing the strike, Wilson acted in 
contravention of an MFGB decision that leaders should offer no advice on how 
their members should vote in this ballot. Leaders in Derbyshire acted similarly, 
and in both districts their actions provoked rank and file anger.67 
 
The second strike vote was surprising. The two leading areas (Yorkshire and 
Lancashire) both lost almost 10% support from the first vote and Scotland lost 
over 25% support for staying on strike. Previously militant south Wales voted 
heavily for a return to work. Stoic Durham, by contrast, maintained a 66.6% 
majority to stay out on a good turnout (74.5%). Exhaustion from the Cambrian 
Combine strike and depleted funds explained south Wales’ collapse. Scotland, 
however, did not share south Wales’ problems and Durham’s fighting funds 
were not significantly superior to the Scots’. Unlike their Scottish counterparts, 
however, the Durham miners had won the minimum wage in principle from the 
owners before the strike. (The owners in south Wales and Scotland had been 
most opposed to the minimum wage.) This partly explained why Durham 
wanted to stay out; to make the strike yield a prize it had not already won before 
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it began.68 This must explain Redheugh lodge’s almost 70% vote to stay out in 
the second ballot after its refusal to vote in protest at the minimum wage 
actually on offer in the first ballot. A Scottish delegate also suggested that a 
lower turnout in his district was in part a result of disgust at the officials’  failure 
to offer a lead. Wilson’s anti-strike ‘leadership’, by contrast, may have had 
something of a galvanizing effect, though his arguments challenging the now 
legally-instituted minimum wage must have kept some from voting to continue 
on the strike.69 
 
The second strike vote also provided an opportunity to test the MWM’s possible 
influence. Soon after the first ballot results were announced the movement held 
a meeting in Spennymoor, admitting its aim of converting local miners to the 
minimum wage. Its impact was at best limited. None of the six lodges in the area 
known to have voted against the strike in the first ballot voted in favour of 
staying out in the second. In only two lodges did more miners actually vote in 
the second ballot. Yet the MWM’s message may have had some impact. In five 
of the six lodges the vote to stay out either held up or increased, albeit often 
beginning at a low level. Furthermore, at Dean and Chapter, the majority of 
three for striking in January increased to 312 in March, turning a 50.1% majority 
to a more convincing 63.8%. Here, the pro-strike vote held up far better with a 
lower turnout.70 But, while the MWM made only limited propaganda advances 
among the lodges during the strike, it had helped to create a determined majority 
in Durham who wanted a minimum wage and one that was worth winning. Thus 
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the second ballot can be regarded as a two-thirds’ majority against the minimum 
wage as outlined in the Minimum Wage Act, and in favour of a something akin 
to the minimum wage advanced by the MWM from autumn 1911. But the 
MFGB as a whole did not return a two-thirds majority to continue the strike, 
which was over by 6 April 1912. Nevertheless, the result of the second ballot, 
and its context, further qualifies claims about Durham miners’ lack of 
enthusiasm for the minimum wage. Indeed, it demonstrates clearly that already 
liberal economic notions were rejected consistently by the majority of rank and 
file Durham miners. 
 
Duncan Tanner’s explanation of the (supposedly unenthusiastic) Durham strike 
votes emphasized long-existing structures and especially cavilling, which 
apparently allayed grievances about ‘abnormal places’ by allowing hewers 
working poor seams the possibility of improving their workplaces every 
quarter.71 This echoed Roy Gregory, who argued that the Durham coalfield’s 
conciliation machinery worked uniquely well, providing a barren socio-
economic environment for the fledgling Labour Party.72 Indeed, some 
contemporaries agreed; the Yorkshire coalowners even suggested introducing 
cavilling there, instead of a minimum wage, an idea the Yorkshire miners 
rejected outright.73 In March 1912, The Times argued that if all Britain’s mining 
districts shared Durham’s conditions, there would be no clamour for a minimum 
wage.74 In Durham, as in Derbyshire (where it erroneously claimed that the 
district’s miners were indifferent to the minimum wage strike), The Times’ 
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interpretation was inaccurate.75 In reality, cavilling was not uniformly popular 
among Durham miners, not least because there was no guarantee that 
individuals working poor cavils would eventually secure a good workplace. 
Activists recognized this and criticized cavilling when making the case for the 
minimum wage. In January 1912, for example, W. P. Richardson remarked that 
if minimum wage opponents ‘were put on a 3s. per day cavil for two quarters 
they would soon become full fledged minimum wagers (laughter).’76  
 
Indeed, the Durham system of wage bargaining was more open to acerbic 
critique than has been recognized. Lawson claimed it was ‘common knowledge’ 
that the County Average was ‘one of the most perfect devices for pitting man 
against man that was ever conceived’ and that some miners worked for a year 
without ever managing to earn it.77 In his brilliant pamphlet, Lawson eloquently 
condemned the Durham average system, which wrung ‘the last ounce of energy 
from the worker at the least possible cost.’78 Lawson recognized that some 
miners earned very much more than the County Average theoretically allowed 
for, but that this was no satisfaction for miners consistently drawing poor cavils. 
He claimed that in one colliery about 40% of the workforce earned below the 
County Average for three quarters consecutively, with some taking home less 
than half of it.79 But coalowners’ profits, Lawson pointed out, had increased 
 
75 Williams, Derbyshire Miners, p. 430. 
76 Durham Chronicle, 26 January 1912. See also Lawson’s comments in Durham Chronicle, 29 
December 1911. 
77 Labour Leader, 11 August 1911. 
78 Lawson, Minimum wage, p. 4 
79 Ibid., Academic studies support the claim that miners’ earnings varied as much as 20% above 
or below the County Average, rather than the 5% officially allowed for. A. L. Bowley and M. H. 
 
  
beyond belief. Thanks to increasing productivity, coal prices (and hence wages) 
might stagnate but profits still rose, all the more since the single colliery (and 
often precarious) concerns had long since been replaced almost entirely by large 
amalgamations of collieries run by millionaire owners.80 In sum, campaigners 
for a minimum wage mounted sophisticated arguments that challenged the 
wages system in Durham. The national strike votes were a measure of how far 
they had come by early 1912. But their battle did not end with a two-thirds’ 
majority in favour of their movement’s minimum wage demand in spring 1912. 
There was plenty of good propaganda, and much more headway, to be made, 
and in this the coalowners, the government, and its representatives on the district 
boards were to prove the minimum wage campaigners’ unwilling accomplices. 
Durham Liberal leaders, too, acted in such a way as to undermine further their 




Under the Minimum Wage Act, retired lawyer Sir Robert Romer was appointed 
chair of the Durham Joint District Board (JDB). As Durham owners and the 
unions failed to agree the minimum, Romer announced the minimum rates by 17 
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May 1912.81 No class of Durham boy fell below the MFGB’s 2s. (10p) lower 
limit. But the hewers’ minimum was set at only 5s. 6d. (27½p) per shift, 7¼d. 
less than the DMA/MFGB request for the County Average, which itself had 
been dismissed by angry minimum wage campaigners who wanted 7s. (35p) 
This was also contrary to the legislation which stipulated that JDB chairmen 
should take average earnings into consideration when setting the minimum. 
Several classes of underground day-wage men secured minimum rates at or 
above 5s. (25p); but others were awarded a meagre 4s. (20p). Romer’s 
explanation for these comparatively low rates was that accommodation and 
domestic coal benefits for married miners were to be continued.82 These 
allowances were commonly valued at 1s. (5p) per shift, though The Times 
claimed that their real value was considerably more. No sooner had the 
minimum been set than the Conciliation Board awarded a 3¾% wages 
advance.83 This reduced opposition to the low minimum rates just awarded; but 
it also inaugurated a process that made the minimum wage look increasingly 
inadequate. 
 
Some of Romer’s rules around operating the minimum wage were also 
contentious, particularly that stipulating that miners forfeited the minimum if 
they were ‘absent from work without leave or without reasonable excuse’ (the 
‘100% rule’). In most other districts, miners could have one day’s leave in a 
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working week of fifty hours and still qualify. But Durham’s working week was 
only forty-one hours. In all districts now miners had to work about forty-one 
hours to qualify for the minimum wage; it happened in Durham that this was a 
full working week. Still, this offended Durham hewers’ jealously guarded 
freedom to decide when they worked. Furthermore, Romer imposed other 
restrictive rules. All piece-workers had to give notice of the cause of any failures 
to perform work equivalent to the minimum wage to the correct official before 
the end of their shift (if practicable, or as soon as possible thereafter). Miners 
forfeited the minimum if they ‘unnecessarily’ delayed in going to their 
workplace at the proper time or if they left their workplace before the proper 
time.84 A movement activist was soon claiming that no other district than 
Durham had a worse settlement under the Minimum Wage Act.85 
 
Revealingly, the Durham owners welcomed Romer’s ‘fair’ attempt to ‘split the 
difference’ between them and the miners. MWM activists were far from 
satisfied. Indeed, they established a more permanent rank and file organization – 
soon known as the ‘Durham Forward Movement’ (DFM) – before Romer had 
announced Durham’s new minimum. This came as the result of a circular of 
mid-April 1912 entitled ‘Durham Miners and Progress’, calling a conference at 
the Shakespeare Hall, Durham, on 4 May 1912. The circular claimed that the 
recent Minimum wage campaign had achieved ‘good results that needed to be 
improved upon’.86 Up to sixty delegates attended on 4 May, with the key 
activists Lawson and W. P. Richardson prominent. Richardson outlined their 
ideas for an educational campaign of conferences and meetings. The conference 
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elected a provisional committee which soon convened and set the campaign in 
motion.87 The DFM began regularly circularizing lodges, inviting attendance at 
its conferences and for lodges to affiliate to the organization and nominate 
candidates for its officers and committee. (It is unclear if lodges were afforded 
representation inside the DFM in accordance with their often very varying 
memberships).       
 
Dissatisfaction was partly a result of the DMA leadership’s conduct of the 
strike: allowing some men to work during the strike was regarded as too 
conciliatory (though the MFGB had agreed that enough should work to keep the 
mines operational, but not to draw coal).88 Then Durham delegates voted at the 
MFGB conference for a return to work, contrary to their own coalfield’s second 
ballot. Wilson claimed this was in response to a call from the MFGB president 
for unity on the vote, though Lancashire and Yorkshire districts’ delegates voted 
against returning to work in line with their mandates.89 Lodges such as Oxhill 
asked the executive to resign over this issue.90  
 
The same Durham officials had appointed themselves to the JDB, instead of 
allowing the membership to elect their own representatives as the MWM 
demanded. As Jack Lawson argued, ‘their officials and executive were against 
them at every stage of the minimum wage agitation, and it was ridiculous to 
think they would be for them while acting as the men’s side of the Wages 
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Board.’91 A lodge resolution to this effect was ruled out of order at the July 1912 
DMA council, with Wilson condemning the lodge activists concerned for 
ignoring the DMA’s rules stipulating that officials were to be members of any 
board related to mining in the county.92 The executive won endorsement for its 
actions only very narrowly, with large lodges such as Marsden still expressing 
disapproval of officials sitting on the JDB.93 This whole episode further 
weakened an increasingly discredited Wilson and his economic ideology.  
The DFM continued the work of the MWM, putting considerable energy into 
miners’ bread-and-butter issues. First, it called for improvements in wages and 
conditions outside the Minimum Wage Act, demanding an eight-hour working 
day and an immediate advance of 20% on surfaceworkers’ wages (who were 
excluded from the minimum wage). The DFM also drew attention to pit-
firemen’s conditions, with a working day of twelve hours for a wage of about 
4s. 10d. (24p). Second, with regard to reforming the Minimum Wage Act itself, 
the DFM called for the inclusion of aged and infirm and surfaceworkers in any 
future legislation.94 Third, it agitated against Romer’s minimum wage awards 
and rules, particularly the ‘100% rule.’ Fourth, it began a sustained criticism of 
the growing gap between the 5s. 6d. minimum and the County Average. Rising 
wages meant that by May 1913 the difference of 7¼d. between the minimum 
and the County Average had grown to 1s. 5¾d. (7p). Interestingly, rising wages 
did not affect activists’ pre-strike rhetoric, which attacked owners’ profits and 
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highlighted the rising cost of living. Finally, the DFM protested over how some 
Durham owners were applying the Act, and their ‘harassment’ of miners over 
the minimum. There was a growing catalogue of ingenious ways that owners 
found of reducing their costs in operating the minimum wage. By summer 1913, 
a new ‘pooling system’ in some pits combined the wages of several hewers, 
with earnings from the better cavils effectively making up those of the poorer 
cavils to the minimum. This neutralized the appeal of caviling; that is even if a 
hewer drew a good cavil he would not take home all of his earnings. 
Furthermore, some owners sought to minimize costs by altering the grades of 
workers due bonuses over and above the minimum wage, in direct contravention 
to Romer’s ruling.95  
 
The DFM certainly attracted most (if not all) MWM-supporting lodges, but also 
drew the support of many more before August 1914. Indeed, at the very least, 
seventy-six lodges with almost 60,000 members (over half the DMA’s 
membership) supported the DFM at some point between May 1912 and August 
1914 (and it is likely that many more were sympathetic). While the DFM was 
therefore bigger than the movement before the minimum wage strike, was it any 
more successful regarding its demands? It could try to intimidate the owners and 
Romer with angry mass meetings, but it really needed the DMA leadership to 
take its grievances to these two sources of power. Naturally, getting the DMA to 
act did not necessarily mean a successful outcome. This was the case for 
surfaceworkers’ grievances which, given the anger in the coalfield, seemed most 
likely to yield a quick victory. In July 1912, DMA council endorsed the DFM’s 
call for a 20% increase in surfaceworkers’ pay and the executive began 
 
95 Ibid., 7 June 1912; 6 December 1912; 23 May 1913; 15 August 1913. 
 
  
discussions with the owners.96 August 1912, however, brought disappointment 
at the owners’ offer of a mere 2d. advance on surfaceworkers’ wages. The DFM 
urged the executive to push for at least 6d. per day (itself about 2d. short of a 
20% increase). Frustration continued, as by late September 1912 the owners had 
still not met the DMA to discuss the 6d. claim. A DFM conference on 12 
October agreed lodges should demand that the executive call a special council 
meeting on the 6d. surfaceworkers’ claim.97 
 
While there was no special council meeting, the scheduled DMA council 
meeting of 9 November 1912 sent a claim regarding surfaceworkers’ pay and 
conditions to the Conciliation Board, a development the DFM endorsed.98 The 
Board, however, ruled for 2d., and DFM activists condemned Wilson’s 
statement on the decision which apparently gave the impression ‘that when the 
Durham miners asked for 6d. and got 2d. they were satisfied.’99 The owners had, 
however, also agreed to make up the 3% discrepancy with day-rate underground 
workers, which allowed the executive to announce that it had negotiated 
effectively an extra 4d. in surfaceworkers’ daily pay packets. While this 
development took some of the sting out of the issue, DMA officials continued to 
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The executive’s apparent concern was no doubt in large part a response to the 
DFM’s mass meetings. Indeed, in summer 1913 the executive held mass 
meetings of its own on surfaceworkers’ grievances, aping the DFM in an evident 
desire to appear dynamic and active.101 This development to some extent 
vindicated William Lawson’s warning to his brother Jack that ‘your opponents 
are now becoming your friends … Mind that they don’t take your programme at 
the last minute.’102 It certainly forced the DFM to justify its continued existence. 
Yet both the executive and the DFM began vesting all hope of addressing 
surfaceworkers’ grievances in the MFGB (which had taken up the issue in 
autumn 1912) and in parliamentary revision of the Minimum Wage Act, due in 
1915.103 Hopes of parliamentary redress appeared dashed in March 1914, when 
an MFGB deputation failed to convince the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, to 
include surfaceworkers in an amended Minimum Wage Act. But the DFM 
continued, apparently undeterred, to demand surfaceworkers’ inclusion in the 
amended Act or in separate legislation.104  
 
Similarly, the DFM struggled to influence Romer on the JDB. Its opening move 
through the DMA was abortive: a resolution requesting a strike ballot on the 
issue of Romer’s minimum wage rules was declared out of order in July 1912.105 
The executive deemed demands for amending Romer’s minimum wage award 
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‘extremely futile’ as the Minimum Wage Act stipulated any award could only be 
amended if the employers agreed; otherwise it was to stand for fifteen 
months.106 Yet this stance could not hope to placate sentiments such as Marsden 
lodge’s ‘strongest indignation’ at the DMA executive’s acceptance of Romer’s 
‘tyrannical, undignified and unworkable rules’, in place of providing ‘a spirited 
condemnation’ and stirring ‘the county up to the point of revolt’ against them.107 
Again, the DMA leaders’ supine stance in relation to the minimum wage 
exposed it to severe criticism.  
 
Romer himself remained unmoved by the DFM’s calls for an increased 
minimum and amendments to the rules. Indeed, on 20 October 1913 Romer 
maintained the minimum wage at 5s. 6d. even though the County Average had 
risen by 1s. 9d. (9p) to 7s. 2d. (36p) since his first award (and Romer himself 
had accepted that under the Act any award must be made in relation to the 
County Average).108 Furthermore, there was no alteration in the ‘100% rule.’ 
The only improvements for the miners were that Romer raised rates for 
juveniles a little and introduced a new rule providing for disputed minimum 
wage cases to be dealt with in seven days.109  
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Romer’s new award provoked widespread outrage, evident in the letters pages 
of the regional press and the minutes of miners’ lodges.110 It looked particularly 
willfully (and indeed inexplicably) ungenerous in comparison with that of the 
chair of the South Wales Joint District Board’s new award.111 DFM protest 
meetings in October and November attacked the award for not providing a 5s. 
per day minimum that even Asquith and the House of Commons had declared ‘a 
reasonable demand.’112 There was momentary accord with DMA leaders who 
also condemned the Romer award. But the President of the Board of Trade, 
Sydney Buxton, rebuffed the executive’s request for an urgent interview on the 
subject, claiming that it had no legal power to intervene in the JDB’s decisions. 
The executive took the matter to the MFGB. The Federation’s complaint about 
the October 1913 award had, by April 1914, precipitated Romer’s resignation as 
JDB chair.113 Yet his unpopular award and accompanying rules remained. A 
DFM circular of June 1914 contained essentially the same demands around the 
minimum wage as its launching statement in May 1912: the campaigners for a 
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Why had the DFM been so ineffective in winning its material demands? The 
explanation partly relates to tactical problems over propagandizing in a rapidly 
changing economic context. Durham wages, which had stagnated after being cut 
in August 1911, began to rise in May 1912. By August 1913, they had reached a 
new post-1900 high of 60% above the 1879 basis. Faced with suddenly rising 
wages, the DFM struggled to find a minimum wage figure that it could 
realistically advocate (and which would appeal to many miners). Worse, it could 
not settle on a consistent mechanism for how the minimum wage should be 
calculated (see below). Furthermore, the altering emphases of its propagandizing 
meant it struggled to channel all the coalfield’s discontents. Its June 1912 
decision to give prominence to surfaceworkers’ grievances in future meetings 
came at the cost of its erstwhile emphasis on old and infirm miners. By August 
1913, surfaceworkers’ grievances were replaced by a new concern for the low 
wages and conditions of juveniles.115 While these also soon fell off the agenda 
(thanks to Romer’s October 1913 award that was comparatively generous to 
juveniles), the old and infirm did not return to the forefront. In a workforce that 
remained highly stratified in terms of roles, status, pay and conditions, the DFM 
understandably struggled to address consistently all the main grades of 
mineworker. Its task was made all-the-more difficult as some grades of 
mineworker were relatively better off under the new minimum wage. Take, for 
example, ‘stonemen’, who were among a class of skilled underground workers 
who built and maintained tracks and pathways and were often elderly, 
performing an arduous task that included loading stones into tubs. They 
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averaged just over 5s. (25p) per day and could earn as little as 3s. (15p) a shift. 
Romer’s first minimum wage award gave them a guaranteed 5s. 6d. per day.116 
A second major problem was what action the DFM was able to take when 
Romer, the owners or the DMA executive ignored it. When should it urge a 
strike and how could it make such action effective? Rank and file activists 
certainly threatened drastic action, as Lawson did in April 1912, promising that, 
if they were not satisfied, the miners ‘would light the flames of revolt … they 
would “down tools” at twenty four hours notice, and take with them the railway 
men and transport workers.’117 When Romer’s first unsatisfactory minimum 
wage award came, an activist suggested (‘without posing as a firebrand’) to a 
mass meeting that ‘a well engineered strike’ over the award ‘could be won in a 
fortnight.’118 Furthermore, by September 1912, considerable rank and file 
dissatisfaction with the minimum wage was evident, according to the Times,  in 
a rash of local strikes, many in Durham’s largest pits.119  A rulebook change of 
December 1911, allowing lodges to strike and retrospectively appeal for funds 
to a DMA council meeting, had initiated a disturbing trend (for the leadership) 
of unofficial action.120  In 1913, at least nineteen lodges struck unofficially (and, 
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according to Wilson, illegally), in a total of twenty-eight separate disputes 
(though their causes were not always recorded).121 But, while militant rhetoric 
resonated on the platform, the DFM was often more cautious in practice. When, 
in December 1912, the Conciliation Board found against DFM demands over 
surfaceworkers’ wages, the movement’s threatened ‘drastic action’ was merely 
increased propagandizing; there came no threat to strike.122  
 
Caution remained evident even when the ‘great indignation’ expressed at a DFM 
conference of 25 October 1913 over Romer’s new award, which had defied the 
most pessimistic predictions, seemed to demand a militant response. Indeed, 
DFM leaders seemed to damp down possible industrial action. Several 
conference delegates claimed that ‘all over the county great difficulty was being 
experienced by the local leaders to prevent their men from striking against the 
award.’123 Lawson, convinced that the award was a gross violation of the 
Minimum Wage Act, suggested a legal response. If DFM leaders had been 
 
121 Wilson’s Monthly Circular, No. 217, January 1914; The Times, 22 April 1913. In his monthly 
circular (No. 217) Wilson provided a table of ‘collieries which stopped illegally during the year. 
It is inserted for the purpose of drawing attention to what is not merely an unconstitutional, but 
an unbusiness-like and unprofitable action. We need not use many words to prove those 
propositions. They are self-evident, as must be clear to even those who institute the illegal 
stoppages’. In fact, after 1906 almost all disputes were ‘lawful’; either Wilson was knowingly 
dissembling here (entirely possible) or ‘illegal’ here means against the DMA’s rules, though 
some of these disputes might well have entailed individuals’ breach of contracts.  See J. Saville, 
‘The Trade Disputes Act of 1906’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 1 (1996), pp. 11–
45 and K. W. Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law (Penguin, third edn.: 1986). I am grateful to 
Paul Smith for this point. 
122 Durham Chronicle, 6 December 1912. 
123 Ibid., 31 October 1913. 
 
  
working to avoid unofficial lodge strikes against the new Romer award they 
were not entirely successful; at least five lodges struck unofficially in late 
October and early November 1913, likely in direct response to it.124 
By late November 1913, however, DFM leaders and militant lodge opinion 
seemed to be more at one. Speaking at Dawdon, Lawson ‘felt the injustice of the 
Romer award so keenly that … if it came to stopping the pits for some weeks it 
would be money well spent.’125 The DFM began arguing that the executive 
taking the issue to the MFGB was insufficient and that ‘deliberate resistance’ 
was justified. But strike action had to be effective. The DFM therefore needed a 
county-wide and ideally official strike; and for this there had to be a favourable 
lodge vote. But the executive ignored the DFM’s calls for an immediate special 
council meeting and to hold a ballot on tendering strike notices ‘to enforce better 
conditions than the award gives.’126 Then the executive prevented a lodge 
proposal for a ballot on the Romer award (presumably about strike action 
against it) from appearing at the 1913 annual meeting. Instead, unofficial 
localized action continued. By 17 June 1914 there had been at least seven 
unofficial disputes involving six lodges that year (four of which had not struck 
unofficially in 1913).127 Two of the worst offending lodges, Hetton and 
Heworth, were also among the most active in the DFM (and among the twenty 
 
124 Ibid., Copy letters regarding unofficial minimum wage strike at Chopwell, Superintendent at 
Felling to Chief Constable of Durham, 23 November 1913–15 December 1913, Tyne and Wear 
Archives Service (TWAS), Newcastle, T148/1; Wilson’s Monthly Circular, No. 217, January 
1914; Manchester Guardian, 9 December 1913.  
125 Durham Chronicle, 28 November 1913. 
126 Ibid., 
127 The disputes were normally only a few days in duration. The collieries striking in 1914 were 
Mainsforth (February and May), Blaydon burn (February), South Moor (March), Framwellgate 
Moor (April), Hetton and Heworth (both June). 
 
  
largest DMA lodges). In total, at least ten of the twenty-three known lodges 
involved in unofficial action after the minimum wage had been introduced were 
active in the DFM (and it is likely many more).128 While the DFM welcomed 
Romer’s resignation in April 1914, it pointed out that discontent with the legacy 
of his award was rife and it again threatened a strike ‘if stern necessity should 
force this upon us.’129 There remained militant voices on DFM platforms too; 
the Horden lodge chairman told a DFM meeting in April 1914 that ‘I don’t 
believe in strikes but I say this, if we cannot get on constitutionally, I would say 
“Strike, men, before we starve” (applause).’130 But a DFM-inspired strike 
against the minimum wage award did not materialize. Indeed, while the DFM 
promised to vocalize the continued rank and file discontent, its attention was 
actually turning away from challenging the current Romer award through 
industrial action to ensuring that the Minimum Wage Act improved when it 
came up for parliamentary amendment in 1915.131  
 
There are several reasons for the DFM’s failure to co-ordinate industrial action 
against the minimum wage award. Crucial was, of course, the continuing 
influence of Wilson and the more moderate DMA officials against any kind of 
industrial militancy. In January 1914 Wilson condemned the trend toward lodge 
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unofficial industrial action. While recognizing  anger over the Romer award, 
Wilson still claimed that it was an improvement in some areas. Launching a 
veiled attack on the DFM for trying to precipitate a strike over the issue, Wilson 
remarked on the ‘pleasing’ way lodges patiently accepted that a strike against an 
Act of Parliament ‘would be the height of indiscretion to say the least, and that 
the Executive Committee had done all that was possible for a body of men to 
do’.132 This argument legitimated the executive ruling’s ‘out of order’ requests 
from lodges for a ballot on strike action over the minimum wage. But it was 
spurious; the Yorkshire Miners’ Association struck over minimum wage rates in 
spring 1914, winning some concessions (but not complete victory).133  
Yet even had a Durham ballot gone ahead there was no guarantee that there 
would have been majority support. First, a rulebook anomaly meant that DMA’s 
largest lodges, most of which were among the most militant (and most likely to 
be involved in the rank and file movements), did not have voting power on 
DMA council commensurate with their size of membership. Second, strike 
action was of course generally regarded as a drastic response, even more so 
given that many DMA lodges had expended considerable funds engaged in or in 
supporting those striking unofficially against the three-shift system in 1910 and 
then spent even more during the (official) 1912 national strike. Few lodges 
could boast, as Chopwell did in 1913, that they had the funds to go it alone 
regardless of receiving (retrospective) central DMA support.134 Indeed, that 
more lodges did strike after the 1911 rule change offered the possibility of 
clawing back funds from the central DMA’s coffers further suggests this. There 
were various other calls on lodge finances too; indeed, the DFM itself offered 
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this relative lack of funds as one reason why more lodges did not attend its 
meetings or affiliate to it.135 The pressure on central funds to subsidize unofficial 
lodge strikes further threatened the DMA’s already relatively precarious 
finances. The 1912 national strike cost the DMA £332,360, about two thirds of 
its total funds: it could have afforded less than three weeks’ strike pay of an 





The minimum wage campaigns from summer 1911, inspired by ILP activists , 
were of considerable significance in terms of the ideological challenge to liberal 
economic notions in the Durham coalfield, as in other British coalfields. Before 
1911, the ILP’s challenge to economic liberalism in Durham had two platforms. 
First, was the abolition of the Conciliation Board, because it only made awards 
based on coal prices. The second was the minimum wage, which the ILP 
agitated around inside the DMA from at least 1898.137 In the years immediately 
preceding 1911, the radicals had concentrated their efforts campaigning inside 
the DMA to end the Conciliation Board. This campaign peaked in 1909, when 
Wilson ruled ‘out of order’ no less than thirty-five lodge resolutions calling for 
the Conciliation Board’s abolition.138 With the reinvigorated MWM after 
summer 1911 the ILP effected a change of tack, shifting its emphasis from the 
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(essentially negative) abolition of the Conciliation Board to the (positive) 
advocacy of an individual minimum wage. The shift was not instantaneous, but 
the Conciliation Board clearly dropped down the radicals’ agenda, warranting 
only three mentions at MWM meetings before the 1912 strike and none after.139  
On a theoretical level the minimum wage was a potentially powerful weapon 
for, as Jack Lawson recognized, it ‘cut right at the root’ of the Durham wages 
system, breaking the traditionally accepted link between coal prices and miners’ 
wages.140 It allowed Lawson to argue convincingly against the notion that if 
wages rose, then the cost of living would follow and assert that ‘the principle of 
wages following prices must be abandoned. We claim that henceforth wages 
shall be the first consideration.’141 The growing receptiveness that ordinary 
Durham miners displayed towards the minimum wage in summer 1911, in 
straitened economic circumstances, explained the change in emphasis, 
augmented when the miners won the individual minimum wage in 1912. As a 
DFM circular put it in November 1912; ‘The owners know quite well the great 
value of the principle which has been wrung from them’.142 It was now up to the 
movement to wring as much as possible from this principle. But the rank and 
file movements were also reacting to the changing economic environment. With 
the Conciliation Board delivering rising wages after May 1912, it became more 
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difficult to attack it directly and appropriate to shift emphasis to the minimum 
wage.  
 
Yet rising wages also posed a problem for the DFM, as it had to modify how it 
argued for the minimum wage. In doing so, it (perhaps inadvertently) reduced 
the minimum wage’s immediate propaganda impact. Initially, the 7s. (35p) 
minimum demand before the 1912 strike was 10¾d. above the then County 
Average. The movement was effectively trying to use the minimum wage as a 
mechanism for winning wage advances. More importantly, advocates of the 
minimum wage did not relate their demand to the County Average in any way. 
But, with the minimum wage won and the County Average beginning to rise 
from May 1912, the DFM stopped arguing for a minimum separate from (and 
higher than) the County Average, and instead suggested there should be no 
discrepancy between the two (the MFGB’s position before the minimum wage 
strike). Then, when the minimum was frozen as the County Average continued 
to grow, the movement conceded more ground in arguing that the discrepancy 
should not be allowed to widen from that originally set by Romer (in May 
1912). In June 1914, the movement reverted to demanding a minimum wage for 
hewers of ‘not less than the County Average’, but not, significantly, back to a 
figure higher than, and, more importantly unrelated to, the County Average.143  
 
Arguing for pegging the minimum wage to the County Average seemed a good 
tactic for maximizing the minimum at a boom time of rising wages. It was, 
however, surely dangerous to advocate too close a link between the minimum 
and the County Average as, when wages began to fall, they would drag the 
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minimum down with them. A direct link, then, between the minimum wage and 
the County Average really meant a continued link between wages and coal 
prices. The real test for the minimum wage would come in a period of declining 
wages. Wages did begin to fall again (by 2.5% in May 1914) but it is unclear if 
(before war broke out),  activists responded by  ceasing to advocate the pegging 
of the minimum wage to the County Average, and instead agitated for a totally 
separate figure that could act as a brake on decreasing wages. Clearly, while the 
minimum wage in principle was a direct attack on liberal economic notions, 
strategic reasons (getting as much out of the owners as possible) in a period of 
rising prices meant that its full ideological impact could not be brought to bear.  
More widely, both Roy Gregory and Duncan Tanner have deployed wage levels 
as a key plank of their case that the economic circumstances of the Durham 
coalfield were not conducive for either the minimum wage or, indeed, an 
independent Labour Party, to make much headway against economic liberalism 
in these years. Tanner echoed Gregory’s claim that high wages bolstered the 
Durham miners’ liberal economic outlook.144 Yet Gregory’s own figures 
showed that, even in the good times, Durham miners were not particularly well 
paid, nor were they compritively  especially well off compared to miners of 
other coalfields. In 1914, Durham hewers’ average wages per shift were only 
mid-table in a ranking of all mining districts (and this included the lodging 
allowance).145 
 
Notwithstanding this, that the rank and file movement, in the form of the DFM, 
grew after the minimum wage was won, testified to its increasing popularity, 
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even during a time of rising wages. This coalition of lodges in favour of the 
minimum wage was also significant in terms of debates about the distribution 
and strength of liberal economic notions in different types of colliery in the 
coalfield. Whereas most of the DMA’s largest lodges supported the DFM (if not 
the MWM before it), the rank and file movement continued to be led by smaller 
lodges. This throws some doubt on Tanner’s ostensibly reasonable suggestion 
that liberal economic views seemed more valid in smaller and older pits that 
tended to be more dependent on individual colliery owners or firms.146 Tanner 
referenced Jack Lawson’s description of the differences in culture when he 
moved from the bustle of the large, modern colliery at Boldon with no social 
relations between managers and miners to the smaller, more settled community 
at West Pelton where lodge officials and managers addressed each other by their 
Christian names.147 Yet this very example was telling. Lawson moved as he had 
been elected checkweighman at Alma, when he was already a well-known ILP 
activist. His new pit should have been more liberal and disinclined both to his 
politics and to the DFM, as should very many of the other leading or active 
DFM lodges of smaller collieries. Clearly, there was a far more complex 
relationship between economic and social contexts and miners’ attitudes to 
economic liberalism and the minimum wage. Relatively harmonious industrial 
relations in individual collieries certainly did not necessarily equate to a popular 
endorsement of economic liberalism there. Poor industrial relations, by contrast, 
seemed almost always related to support for the minimum wage campaigns. 
Indeed, as argued above, the minimum wage provided, for a number of reasons, 
a new source of industrial unrest in many Durham pits. 
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The campaigners for a minimum wage in Durham between 1911 and 1914 failed 
to make many immediate material gains, but their efforts were far from wasted. 
Through energetic agitation, combined with rising prices and wages struggling 
to keep pace, they achieved a consistent two-thirds’ majority in favour of their 
‘radical’ (that is more encompassing and larger) minimum wage by spring 1912. 
The link between wages and coal prices had been broken, a monumental 
achievement in a coalfield where liberal economic notions had been as 
engrained in the wage negotiating machinery as they were in the minds of most 
Durham miners and certainly their Liberal leaders. In helping to secure this two-
thirds’ majority, Durham activists denied Wilson and other minimum wage 
opponents an opportunity to refuse support for the national strike, when their 
record suggests they would surely have used any that presented itself to break 
the solidarity of the MFGB in 1912. Thus a repeat of 1893 was avoided.  
The delicate balancing act inside the MFGB, seeking to find a minimum wage 
demand that would satisfy its very distinctive constituent unions, could not hope 
to meet all the Durham militants’ demands. But its stance on the minimum wage 
and the ways it would later intervene on behalf of the DMA against Romer 
demonstrated its practical utility to Durham miners. Activists in Durham had 
built an impressive degree of solidarity between those who did and did not 
benefit from the actual minimum wage in the face of a largely hostile DMA 
leadership and scaremongering local press. That they subsequently increased 
and consolidated this support after the minimum wage was won was no mean 
achievement and testament to the further undermining of economic liberalism 
among Durham miners between the end of the strike and the outbreak of war.  
 
  
While a 7s. minimum was, as Lawson claimed, ‘not exactly the millennium’, for 
the owners and Durham miners’ leaders it might as well have been.148 
Campaigners for a minimum wage had undermined Wilson, allowing him to 
appear increasingly out-of-touch and unsympathetic to his members’ interests, 
as well as autocratic. That the coalowners attempted by various means to 
prevent miners from claiming the minimum wage, what the majority now felt 
was their entitlement, threw into even greater doubt Wilson’s shibboleths about 
shared interests between miners and owners in the coal industry. Jack Lawson 
wrote that the ‘facts’ drew him into public life and the MWM: ‘I preached no 
abstract economic theory not even that of Marx. I knew the problem better than 
any theorist and had plenty of material at hand from day-to-day experience to 
point the moral.’149 The minimum wage movement is testament to how 
effectively Lawson’s ‘moral’ hit home. He, and his fellow campaigners, clearly 
made considerable headway in undermining the liberal economic hegemony and 
those who espoused it during these years. In making such progress in a 
stronghold of economic liberalism, the miners’ minimum wage suggested that, 
in the hands of dedicated and intelligent activists, it was a potent ideological 
weapon throughout the nation’s coalfields.    
 
148 Lawson, Minimum wage, p. 7. 
149 Lawson, Man’s Life, p. 117. 
